Abstract-In this paper, we pioneer a key security level gradation scheme which is proved to efficient to counteract Iterative-Encrypting-Attack against RSA. And we make it clear that the bug which hides after the traditional key generation algorithm is exploited by Iterative-EncryptingAttack and weakens RSA security, and that the case can be improved if the traditional key generation algorithm is modified delicately. After analyzing the preliminaries and practical steps of Iterative-Encrypting-Attack in detail, we propose the concept of security grade of key-pair and depict the hierarchy of grades systematically, and bring forward an algorithm that grades security grade of key pairs. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of attack cost into the gradation prototype, then program for grading algorithm and set in motion a series of experiments for surveying the relationship between attack-cost and key-security-grade. At last, by the attained result from experimental statistics, we point it out that if key-pair is properly chosen RSA system can acquire a satisfying immunity from IterativeEncrypting-Attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
RSA is an asymmetric (public key) encryption scheme which used widely in security application of E-Commerce and Internet-Bank. By protocol its security precondition is keeping private-key secrete. However, it is found that it is possible to restore plaintext by iteratively encrypting cipher-text a limited times. On this attack, some fundamentals, mechanism and countermeasure are discussed and explored in depth in this literature, which are unknown by most professionals.
A. Chosen Cipher-text Iterative Encrypting Attack
In the case above cipher-text is gotten easily by interception, while the encryption key is public to everyone, condition of attack isnt less than required.
For example. e = 215861, n = 283189,plaintext = 3250. a hacker iteratively encrypts message 3250 as followed. 3250 215861 mod 283189 = 1598. Similarly hacker intercepts any cipher-text which is sent from sender to receiver on insecure channel, operates it 3 times encryption and corresponding plaintext can be restored ,who breaks the privacy of communication into pieces. Cipher-text Iterative-Encrypting-Attack is defined by such attack method.
Such thing happens not only as to small integer, but also as to integer of which length reaches 36 bits or more.
Here is an example. e = 330244721, n = 5271699073. After 256 times encryption you can restore plaintext.
B. Previous Work
Cipher-text Iterative-Encrypting-Attack against RSA is firstly referred in [1] , but further progress research has been ceased with regret since then. Crypto-analysis focus in recent years in respect of RSA is transferred to other attack methods. E.g. the attack is named WeakPrime-Attack ,which exploiting computational errors that occur during the key generation operation, power-analysis attacks, and some other attack trying factoring modulus n of RSA by a list of methods such as Lattice Factoring Method [2] , Partial Key Exposure Factoring Method [2] , and so on.
Recent some related research result points out that RSA still can provide security not less than good if you accept advice given against some discovered and possible effective attack.For example, adopting strong prime, avoiding the fixed public exponent, evading small prime p or q, and carefully extract key-pair on generating keys [3] and so on.
However, facts show that none of those advices can provide RSA immunity from Iterative-Encrypting-Attack.
C. Further Progress
In the book titled "Number Theory for Computing" written by Song Y. Yan and published in 2002, some further progress involved has been made [5] . The relationship between determinant of "k-th residual equation" and primitive root is covered clearly, which points out the direction to counteract Iterative-Encrypting-Attack.
D. Our Contribution
In the course of survey and experiment concerned the subject, we analyze and pioneer a key security level gradation scheme which is proved to counteractive not less than required against Iterative-Encrypting-Attack. In the meantime, the comprehension of Iterative Encrypting Attack and the theoretical flaws after attack algorithm itself is improved up to a level which hasn't been touched [4] .Definitely, 2 items are summarized as follows.
(1). After analyzing the course of Iterative-EncryptingAttack in detail ,we pioneer the concept of security grade of key-pair ,devise an algorithm that grades security grade of key-pairs, and profile the hierarchy of grades.
(2).We introduce the concept of attack cost into security grade analysis, then program grading algorithm and practice a series of experiments for the purpose of going through the relationship between attack cost and key security grade.
(3).Experiment statistics and the analysis of them make it clear that if key is chosen properly and in reason RSA system can provide the satisfying immunity from Iterative-Encrypting-Attack.
II. SOME RELATED PRELIMINARIES There are many good formal definitions for public key crypto-systems, and we don't try to cover all of them here. Instead ,a public key cryptosystem is described by the following.
1.A set M of plaintexts (or messages), and a set C of cipher texts.
2. A set K p of public keys, and a set K s of secret keys.
A key generation algorithm key
4. An encryption algorithm E :
The inputs to the key generation algorithm are called the security parameters. It is expected that as the security parameter increases, the resources required to break the crypto-system should increase more rapidly than the resources required to use it. Ideally, the running time of a break should be a (sub-)exponential function of n, while the running time of key − gen, E, and D should be some polynomial in n.
As to RSA, security parameters are extracted on the basis of number theory subject to a condition that a instance of (sub-)exponential problem is constructed while RSA key pair being generated. While attack method is improved based on some preliminaries as followed in order to counteract the restraint above.
In this section, we present the notion of a public key crypto-system and discuss some related preliminaries laying foundation for the RSA system and IterativeEncrypting-Attack.
A. Introduction of Notations
We introduce some basic notations that are used throughout the paper as Figure I , the rest notations are introduced where referred.
B. Definitions and Theorems on Primitive Root
Definition 1. q-th root of unity.Let n be a positive integer, and q be a integer, we call p a q-th root of unity if (1) .
Definition 2.Order of p mod n . Suppose n be a positive integer, and p be a integer subject to (2) if there exists the smallest positive value of x as (3), we call x the Order of p mod n , denoted by ord n (p) or ord(p, n) .
Definition 3. Primitive root of n. Suppose n is a positive integer, and p is an integer subjected to (2) , if p satisfies (2) we define p a Primitive root of n . Theorem 1. If n is a positive integer, and p is an integer for which (2) and (4) Further deduction from theorem 2. If p i , p j where i = j are distinct primes and there is an integer n for which n = a a and a > 3 or (10) for which a ≥ 2,or k ≥ 2 , then there doesn't exist Primitive root modulus n .
Theorem 1 reveals that the order of p mod n is a factor of Euler value of n.Further deduction from theorem 2 demonstrates that if a positive integer n has multi odddistinctive-prime factors, the primitive root to modulus doesn't exist. Both results are used in the analysis of Cipher-text Iterative-Encrypting-Attack covered in the sections followed. Proof of both theorem 1 and theorem 2 is covered in detail in reference [2] .
C. Principles of Iterative Encrypting Attack
The mathematical proof of RSA is demonstrated in [5] in detail which isn't provided here.
According to RSA algorithm, because (11) .
So there always exists an integer d subject to (12) .
And by Euler theorem [6] , (13) is always satisfied. Which can be rewritten into (14) .
That is to say that d can be expressed by some form of modulus-exponent of e . By definition 1, denote (p − 1)(q−1) by n,then e is a q-th root of unity which satisfies (16).
By the further deduction from theorem 2, because n can't be a composite which only contains unity-prime factor, it is impossible for e to be primitive root of n .In other words, there certainly exists an integer x smaller than φ(n) subject to (17) , by which extract d as (18).
In order to counteract "p − 1-factoring method " [7] , p and q are subject to that both p−1 and q−1 should contain enough big prime factors, and a conventional process is selecting two big primes p 1 and q 1 subject to (19), p, q being another pair primes, and these primes like p named strong primes or secure primes.
Because of (19), (20) can be gotten and rewritten further into (20).
By Euler Formula, we deduce (21).
By conclusion (2) of theorem 1, we demonstrate x | φ(n).That is to say that x is sure to be a factor of φ(n).Obviously,p 1 , q 1 are prime integers, and are odd integers too, and φ(n) is sure to be expressed in (22),for which k is a positive integer,θ 1 , θ 2 are 2 odd distinctive integers but unable be confirmed to be 2 odd prime integers.
We define S as a set of all positive factors of φ(n) which is smaller than φ(n) − 1 .Namely, as (23).
For example. p 1 = 53, q 1 = 83. θ 1 , θ 2 are 2 odd distinctive prime integers 13 and 43 respectively as (24) and s = 4 to satisfy (25).
Another example. p = 179, p 1 = 89, q = 263, q 1 = 131. θ 1 , θ 2 are 2 odd distinctive integers 11,65 respectively, but one of both be non-prime as (26).
Set S can be extracted by "exhaustively-listingmethod". However,by further progress analysis,it is more meaning to divide S into several subsets as far as researching Cipher-text Iterative-Encrypting-Attack is concerned.
III. KEY SECURITY GRADING ALGORITHM
As analysis above, the number of positive factors of φ(n) is different by φ(n) ,but x is sure to be some factor of φ(n) from which d can be derived. Suppose θ 1 < θ 2 ,the positive factors of φ(n) denoted by x of which expression form only ranges in the 4 types as follows.
(1).Composite factors expressed as (27) , where t be a positive integer. (2) .Composite factors expressed as (28) , where t be a positive integer and θ 1 be the unique odd factor.
Composite factors expressed as (29) , where t be a positive integer and θ 2 be the unique odd factor.
(4). Composite factors expressed as formula (30) , where t be a positive integer and θ 1 × θ 2 be the unique odd factor.
According to analysis of Iterative-Encrypting-Attack against RSA, there inevitably exists x for which subject to (17) . The essence of issue is how big is x for which it is enough to defeat Iterative-Encrypting-Attack as far as current computation power is concerned, and how to choose p, q and e in order to keep x in a rational magnitude.
In section II,we prove that it is possible to recover plaintext by operating cipher-text with x−1 times encrypting operations. That is to say the time cost of cracking security for adversary is O(n) . Whereas, x is one of factors of φ(n) ,where (17) is satisfied. If is conditioned by the enough length in bits or the rational magnitude when RSA key-pair (e, d) is randomly generated, adversary is defeated to recover plaintext or secret key exponential d by Iterative-Encrypting-Attack.
Let be a set of all positive factors of φ(n) , which can be divided into 4 subsets, where the factors of each subset are with an approximate equal length in bits. For example, the bit-length of composite factors approximately equal to log 2 θ 2 ,which are expressed as formula (29) where t be a positive integer and θ 2 be the biggest odd factor. That provides an index to security level or security grade of key-pair. We construct a scheme that grade security of key according to the approximate bit-length.
A. Hierarchy of Key-security Grades
Definition 4. A-Grade security.Given a key-pair (e, n) and (d, n) ,where n be a multiply of two distinctive strong big primes and e, d subject to (17) and (12), x denotes the same object as section , if the factor-multiply-expression of x is as equation (27) where t be a positive integer, we define the key-pair like so A-Grade security key. In other words, the key-pair is with A-Grade security.
In general, key with A-Grade security is insecure at all. Under condition of that n is a multiply of two distinctive strong big primes t usually is a small integer far less than 1024, if the key-pair like so in use, adversary is able to restore plaintext easily by siding secret key.
For example,e = 10789, n = 17869 , x is extracted to equal to 4,which is A-Grade security key.
Definition 5.D-Grade security and D-Grade security.Given a key-pair(e, n) and (d, n),where n and e, r, x represent the same object as above and be subject to the same condition as above , if the factor-multiplyexpression of x is as equation (28) where t be a positive integer, and θ 1 be the biggest odd factor in expression of x,but subject to θ 1 < θ 2 in factor-multiply-expression of x , we define the key-pair like so B-Grade security key. Namely, the key-pair like so be with B-Grade security. Similarly, replace parameter θ 1 by an alternative θ 2 , and C-Grade security key is defined clearly.
Keys with B-Grade security or with C-Grade security are more secure than the key-pair with A-Grade security. If selecting two primes p, q subject to | q |≈| q | to generate key-pair, bit-length of θ 1 or θ 2 reaches half of log 2 n [8] .
For example. e = 96957 ,n = 45378321827173574521.
x is extracted to equal to 1736370016256,which is CGrade security key.
Definition 6.D-Grade security.Among prime factors of φ(n) ,θ 1 × θ 2 is the biggest. If factor-multiplyexpression of x is as equation (30) where t be a positive integer, we define the key-pair like so D-Grade security key, that is to say the key-pair like so with D-Grade security.
In general, key with D-Grade security is most secure in all keys. If n is a multiply of two distinctive strong big primes of 512 bits, n usually is with length of 1024 bits approximately. According to Euler formula (31), the length of φ(n) is the same as n nearly, this length equals to that of x by and large. If D-Grade security key-pair is used, it is impossible for adversary to restore plain-text by Iterative-Encrypting-Attack.
For example. e = 64901283950278929592548656860163949793. n = 1038420543204462873545578353796907431177. x = 2028165123446216549514021136121200640. It is D-Grade security key.
B. Maximum Attack Time and Threshold Attack Time
Definition 7.Maximum Attack Time.Given a keypair (u, n) and (r, n) ,where its security Grade is "AGrade, by the definition of A-Grade security, if an adversary sets in motion Iterative-Encrypting-Attack he can succeed at cost of 2 k times encryption operations at the utmost, where (30) is satisfied, for which k is a positive integer, θ 1 , θ 2 are 2 odd distinctive integers. We define the time cost of the 2 k times encryption operations on computation platform installed a visual CPU at speed of Giga FLOPS(Giga of FLOating Point operations per Second, abbreviated by GFLOPS) is Maximum Attack Time abbreviated by MAT.
Definition 8.Threshold Attack Time.Given a key-pair (e, n) and (d, n),where its security Grade is B-Grade, by the definition of B-Grade security, if an adversary triggers Iterative-Encrypting-Attack it is possible to succeed for him at cost of θ 1 times encryption operations at lowest, where (30) is satisfied, for which k is a positive integer,θ 1 , θ 2 are 2 odd distinctive integers. We define the time cost of θ 1 times encryption operations on computation platform installed a visual CPU at speed of GFLOPS is Threshold Attack Time of B-Grade abbreviated by TAT-B [9] .
Similarly, we define Threshold Attack Time of CGrade which abbreviated by TAT-C, and Threshold Attack Time of D-Grade which abbreviated by TAT-D.
IV. DESIGN OF GRADING SECURE LEVEL ALGORITHM
On the basis of some theorems, definitions and analysis above, we pioneer an algorithm to grade the security of keys. However, the security requirement of key can be defined in many ways. In general, while defining a security goal it is important to state what resources are available to an attacker and what success criteria the attacker must fulfill. Stated in detail, a very basic requirement is that it shouldnt be possible to derive the secret key from the public key efficiently. Indeed, and it is considered the most devastating cryptanalytic break aiming for computing K s from K p at cost of polynomial time. There are many issues that arise in determining good notions of security, and we do not try to address them all here.
In view of other legacy secure requirement as mentioned above, the process of filtering prime is still reserved in our design and some restraint condition is left untouched. Such as the condition of strong primes and the measures against Partial Key Exposure [10] and so on. Some concerned examples is to exhibited in the section followed.
A. Generation of a Strong Prime
In this section we recommend an algorithm for generation of a safe prime. It follows the single party protocol proposed by [3] , where p and p 1 prime subject to (19).
1. The players generate a random number p 0 with proper bit-length.
2. If j = 1 compute (32) .If j = 1 compute (33) .
3. Run the trial division on p and p 0 . If either of them appears to be divisible by a small prime, go to step 1.
4. Run the Miller-Rabin test on p 0 with ζ = 1 and g = 1. If it fails, go to step 1.
5. Run the Miller-Rabin test on p with ζ = 1 and g = 1. If it fails, go to step 1.
6. Run the Miller-Rabin on p with a sufficiently large ζ and some random g, and ensure a small error probability (e.g. 2 −64 ). If it fails, go to step 1, else return a probability safe prime p .
As the p 0 are not random (n − 1) bit numbers, some care must be taken in choosing the parameter ζ in step 6.We do not address these details here. Assuming (34) is satisfied, and that safe primes are sufficiently dense , as is widely conjectured and supported by empirical evidence. The expected bit-complexity of this algorithm is as (35), where γ = 128 is a security parameter smaller than n. Assuming that one tests about n 2 /(lgn) 2 candidates in parallel, the round-complexity is O(n) .
B. Grading Security Level of Key
application, it is easy to compute secret exponential d by (12) , then a RSA key-pair is generated. Let p × q be with k bits in bit-length. The possible most loops of algorithm is as (39). So, the time-complexity of this algorithm is O(k) .
V. IMPLIMENTATION AND EXPERIMENT
We program the security level gradation algorithm using Matlab version 7.0 and Victor Shoups Number Theory Library package [12] . The experiment program operates in two phases.
At the beginning, given a pair of p, q, it extracts each candidate key and its corresponding security grade, and count the keys at uniform in security strength, so as to survey the distribution of different security grade, which would provide help for classifying candidate keys. Second, it tries to grade keys according to current security requirements and attack cost of typical attack method in order to estimate security index as viewed from nowadays computation power usually owned by an average entity.
A. Distribution of Keys with Different Grade
First, it exhaustively grades the security level of all possible key pairs which derived from a certain given prime pair, then classifying and counting key-pairs by security grade; where subjects of prime is required not more than 32 bits in length. However, exhaustively-grading-method requests to cost a lot of computation power. As to the bigger prime it is unrealistic to grade all possible keys but to grade a part of keys instead, e.g. grading 0x7ffffff (about 2 27 ) keys. A segment of data is shown in Table II ,which reveals that the key-pairs with different security grade always exist for a prime-pair and what distinguishes them is total or density. The upper is the security grade of key and the total of that is bigger. Over 90 percent of keys are Grade D keys, i.e. nearly all keys are substantially secure, but which is far from an excuse to put it on one side. A bit of flaw or neglect probably leads security to end in the area of information security and the disastrous lesson like which is far from of no occurrence [13] .
B. Cost of Attack and Security Grade
Second, it simulates adversary to trigger Iterative Encrypting Attack against key-pairs in different security grade as to estimate the cost of time and computation power.
In this phrase of experiment, most operation of attack is modulus exponential, which with a high cost of time and memory space. In order to better running speed, much implementation introduces some improving measures. E.g. taking a share fixed public key exponential e on encrypting. Saving the key parameters p and q, by Chinese Remainder Theorem reducing a big modulus into a small one in decryption ,but not computing the modulus exponential of a big integer directly [14] .
The experiments are operated on the computing platform of a high performance cluster, named DeepComp 6800, made in Lenovo, with 24 computing nodes networked by Myrinet, each of which is provided with both processors of Intel IA-32 Pentium 4 Xenon 2000 MHz, of which overall maximum computing speed of system reaching 89.6 GFlops [15] . Statistics about a key-pair with 1026 bits in length are listed in Table III, and Table IV exhibits that MAT-A is teen GFLOPS•Seconds, that is to say grade-A keys are insecure at all, and that other 3 TATs are far over 10 100 GFLOPS•Years, which are strong and distinctively immune from Iterative Encrypting Attack as viewed from today computation power usually owned by an average entity. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS
During the exploration and research, we pioneers a key security level gradation scheme by which those weak keys threatened by Iterative-Encrypting-Attack are filtered easily, in other words, which build up the immunity of RSA system from Iterative-Encrypting-Attack. After analyzing the preliminaries and practical steps of Iterative-Encrypting-Attack in detail, we initiate the concept of security grade of key-pair and profile the hierarchy of grades systematically. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of attack cost into the gradation prototype, then program for grading algorithm and practice a series of experiments for the purpose of exploring the relationship between attack-cost and key-security-grade.
As to RSA security application in reality and further work about the subject,2 items are summarized as follows.
A. Proposal for key-pair Extraction
In this paper, we present key-pair security gradation scheme against Iterative-Encrypting-Attack, and illustrate 4 security grades of keys and their grading algorithm. In addition, the time performance of key and the corresponding experiment data is analyzed and summarized in depth. Customarily, people tend to relate the security of system to crypto algorithm, the center of gravity of concern on security is placed on algorithm. As a matter of fact, and security grade is a primary characteristic of key. In the engineered application of a strong algorithm there are chances of generating weak keys, which puts the information security in danger of collapse. It is potential and necessary to quantitatively meter security attribute of key and to promote it in information security engineering as a memorandum.
By the conclusion drawn from this research we propose that candidate keys should be graded and should be proved with a sound security grade not lower than the point where the computation power owned by adversary is evaluated as inadequate to break as possible. As to keypair generation of RSA, here we don't recommend keys with some imperative specific security grade. Research and experiment makes it clear that the advice is constructive to defeat Iterative-Encrypting-Attack.
B. Outstanding problems Involved in the Research
In the study, we find two interesting outstanding problems.
(1). Density of key derived from two very big strong primes varies with different security grade. Does it manifest a similar distribution profile with prime less than some integer? And theory about prime distribution is illustrated in Prime Number Theorem [5] . (2) . Can it be confirmed that there dont exist more effective attack algorithms against a key with certain security grade than Iterative-Encrypting-Attack? This will influences estimate of MAT and TAT.
